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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
ST'ATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT L. McMULLIN, PHYLLIS 
B. McMULLIN, and McMULLIN 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., 
Petitioners, 
-vs.-
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, HAL S. BENNETT, 
DONALD HACKING and JESSE R. 
S. BUDGE, Its Commissioners; and 
UNION AND JORDAN IRRIGA-
TION COMPANY, a corporation, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 8660 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
This is a review of proceedings before the Public 
Service Commission of Utah. The petitioners requested 
Union and Jordan Irrigation Company to serve certain 
property with culinary water. The petition was denied 
by the Public Service Commission. Petitioners request 
this court to reverse that decision. 
Petitioners set forth their statement of facts on 
pages 4, 5 and 6 of their brief. There are essential facts 
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omitted. Other facts stated were disputed. Under all of 
the circumstances respondents deem it advisable to make 
a full statement herein. The findings of the Commission 
are found on pages 22 to 29 of the transcript. Reference 
will be made in this statement to both the findings of 
the Commission .and the record where such facts are es-
tabli.shed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Union and Jordan Irrigation Company was incor-
porated in 1895 as "a mutual water company for the 
purpose of distributing irrigation water to its stock-
holders" (Tr. 22, 330-331). There was no amendment 
of its articles except to extend the life of the corporation 
to 100 years ( Tr. 22, 330). Such corporation is not au-
thorized to act as a public utility and cannot under its 
articles of incorporation pay dividends. Until 1916 it 
functioned only a.s a mutual water company. In 1916 the 
cornpany constructed a pipeline system for the serving 
of culinary water (Tr. 22, 330-331). Culinary service 
was rendered to stockholders and nonstockholders alike 
( Tr. :22, 331). At that time it dedicated 1.5 c.f.s. of the 
flow of Little Cottonwood Creek to such culinary system 
( Tr. :2:2, 331, 479). The conrpany did in fact assign 2.5 
c.f.~. to the pipeline system, but it sold 1 c.f.s. of this to 
Sandy City, using the proceeds frmn such sale for con-
~truction of the culinary systern. The company has nezyr 
dedicated more than 1.5 c.f.s. to such system and the 
remainder of the u:ater has been used for irrigation 
1mrposcs as in the case of other mutual companies. Since 
1916 the eompany has subrnitted itself to the jurisdiction 
of the Public Utilities Cornrnission, subsequently desig-
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nated as Public Service Commission as to the 1.5 c.f.s. 
by the filing of financial reports and filing of rates (Tr. 
22, 332). No formal certificate of convenience and 
necessity was ever issued to the company (Tr. 22, 333). 
In 1946 at the request of the Public Service Commission 
the company filed a map showing its pipeline system 
and the area which it purported to serve with culinary 
water (Tr. 23, 334). A copy of the map so filed is a part 
of this record as Exhibit 1. 
Should the area designated on the map, Exhibit 1, 
as the service area of the company become fully de-
veloped as a residential and commercial area the com-
pany will be called upon to serve upward of 6,000 water 
connections (Tr. 331). At the time of the hearing the 
company had in excess of 1,000 customers (Tr. 23, 452). 
These connections use substantially the entire 1.5 c.f.s. 
in hot weather (Tr. 471, 472). There was testimony that 
there might be 100 more connections on the 1.5 c.f.s. 
(Tr. 500) but it also appeared that at times more than 
1.5 c.f.s. were being used, taking it from Sandy City 
(Tr. 501). 
The company has never served culinary water out-
side of the area designated on Exhibit 1, except that in 
May 1952, Kenneth A. Brady and Donald B. Milne filed 
.a petition with the Public Service Commission to require 
culinary service in a subdivision lying north of the desig-
nated area. The entire file in that case was made a part 
of this record (Tr. 215-300). The area involved was 
called the Bonneville Terrace and is shown as that 
colored purple on the m.ap designated page 234 of the 
record. The petition of Brady and Milne was resisted by 
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Union and Jordan Irrigation Company, but after a hear-
ing the Public Service Commis.sion ordered the company 
to furnish water in this subdivision. The case was never 
appealed to this court, though after the time for rehear-
ing had expired a petititon to reopen the case was filed 
by Union and Jordan Irrigation Company and denied by 
the Public Service Commission (Tr. 235, 239). 
In July of 1955 a petition was filed by Clifton C. 
Nowlan, Roland Parker and Kermit Eskelson to require 
culinary service in another area lying on the easterly 
side of the area designated on Exhibit 1. The entire 
proceeding in that case was made a part of this record. 
(Tr. 125 to 214). The Public Service Commission denied 
the petition, finding, among other things, 
"The life blood of a water syste1n is the water 
and a satisfactory supply of culinary water cannot 
be manufactured. Even though it may be within 
the powers of this Commission to order the com-
pany to extend its water service to the proper-
ties of petitioners which are outside the area 
which the company professes to serve and is now 
serving we feel the circumstances in this case 
would not warrant such action. If such action 
were taken by the Commission other property 
owners adjacent to the area served by the com-
pany could with good justification demand that 
service be extended to then1 and there would be 
no place to stop. The cmnpany under such cir-
cunlstances would be cmupelled to expand its sys-
tenl far beyond what was ever contemplated and 
outside the sphere of its duty and re.sponsibility. 
Such expansion could Yery well iinpair or destroy 
further expansion of service within the service 
area of the cmnpany .as set forth in Exhibit 1.'' 
(Tr. 207). 
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Petitioners in about January 1955, were negotiating 
for the purchase of separate properties from Selma Olson 
Malmstrom and James Olson (Tr. 23). These were sepa-
rate properties (Exhibit 3, Tr. 92). The Selma Olson 
:Malmstrom property lies substantially within the service 
area as designated in Exhibit 1. The James Olson prop-
erty lies wholly outside of the designated area (Tr. 92). 
For the convenience of the court there is included as an 
appendix of this brief a map of the area and property 
in question. This is substantially the same as Exhibit 3 
(Tr. 92). The portion of the property shaded in blue i~ 
that portion in question designated as within the service 
area in 1946 and is in accordance with the map filed with 
the Public Service Commission, Exhibit 1. That portion 
of the property outlined in red is that portion of the 
property purchased from Selma Olson Malmstrom. That 
portion of the property outlined in green is the property 
purchased by petitioners from James F. and Mary P. 
Olson, referred to as the James Olson property (Exhibit 
3. Tr. 92, 342, 386). The line running east and west, 
designated as "B'' is the north line of the property desig-
nated on the map as within the service area (Exhibit 3. 
Tr. 92, 343). Such line bisects the southeast quarter of 
Section 19, one-half of the quarter section lying north 
and one-half lying south (Tr. 343). The line designated 
as "A" is a line on which there was a ditch and a row of 
trees, which has been assumed by certain parties to ba 
the north line of the charted area, but which in fact wa~:; 
not (Tr. 342). 
The Union .and Jordan Irrigation Company is serv-
ing the Selma subdivision and there is no question with 
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regard to that area. It has refused to serve the James 
Olson property, which has not yet been subdivided, but 
is nevertheless designated as Selma No. 2. It is the 
"Selma 2" area that is now in question. 
While negotiating for the purchase of these proper-
ties Robert L. McMullin contacted Frank Pierson, Secre-
tary and Treasurer of the company, asking for a letter 
to the State Board of Health to the effect that the com-
pany would serve the Olson property. It is disputed as 
to whether Mr. Mc~Iullin mentioned both the Selma 
Olson property and the James Olson property or only 
the Selma Olson property. Frank Pierson testified that 
it was only the Selma Olson property (Tr. 506). Mr. 
:McMullin testified that it was both properties (Tr. 389). 
The letter which was sent to the State Board of Health, 
quoted on page 5 of brief of petitioners, states that the 
proposed subdivision was ''located east of Third East 
and approximately 6900 South." Sixty-ninth South is 
entirely south of both properties, being south of the 
Sehna subdivision and located as shown on line "C" on 
the map attached as an appendix to this brief (Tr. ±30). 
\Vhen the designated area is fully developed for residen-
tial use it is estimated that there will be approximately 
6,000 connections. This fact wa.s stipulated (Tr. 331). 
In .answer to plaintiff's petition, defendant denied 
that it was subject to the orders of the Public Service 
Commission so far as such orders require serving the 
a rea in question ( Tr. 10). 
A number of the stockholders appeared at the hear-
ing and objected to the petition on the ground that the 
defendant Union and Jordan Irrigation Comp.any was 
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not authorized to act as a public utility by its articles of 
incorporation and as to the area in question it had never 
offered to serve as .a public utility and the commission 
therefore had no authority to order service therein (Tr. 
305, 306). 
On page 4 of their brief as a part of the statement 
of facts, petitioners state, "However because of the un-
certainty as to the boundaries of the service area to the 
informality of the authority of the respondent company 
to serve, Mr. McMullin was not aware of the location 
of the service area of the respondent company." (Italics 
ours.) We do not admit there was any uncertainty as to 
the service area. On the contrary it is cle.arly outlined on 
Exhibit 1, which since 1946 has been on file with the 
Public Service Commission. 
On page 5 of petitioners' brief it is stated that, "He 
(McMullin), therefore, contacted the Secretary-
Treasurer of the respondent company and requested that 
the company furnish him with culinary water in the 
property which he proposed to buy .and develop into a 
subdivision." We disagree with this statement there 
being a definite dispute as to whether Mr. McMullin men-
tioned only the Selma Olson Malmstrom property or 
both the Selma and James Olson properties. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH DID 
NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO EXTEND SERVICE TO THE 
PROPERTY IN QUESTION. 
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POINT II 
THERE IS NO ESTOPPEL WHICH CAN BE APPLIED 
IN THIS CASE. 
(a) THE FACTS DO NOT WARRANT A FINDING OF A 
MISREPRESENTATION. 
(b) IF A MISREPRESENTATION WAS MADE THERE 
WAS NO RELIANCE THEREON TO THE DETRI-
MENT OF THE PETITIONERS. 
(c) ESTOPPEL MAY NOT BE INVOKED IN A PRO-
CEEDING BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COM-
MISSION AS THE BASIS FOR AN ORDER TO 
SERVE. 
POINT III 
THE UNION AND JORDAN IRRIGATION COMPANY 
HAS NO OBLIGATION TO SERVE PETITIONERS IN THE 
AREA REQUESTED. 
POINT IV 
AS TO SERVICE OUTSIDE OF THE AREA DESIG-
NATED ON THE MAP FILED IN 1946, EXHIBIT 1, RE-
SPONDENT IS NOT A PUBLIC UTILITY. 
POINT V 
THE ORDER IN THE CASE OF NOWLAN, PARKER 
AND ESKELSON v. UNION AND JORDAN IRRIGATION 
COMPANY PREVENTS FURTHER EXTENSION OF SERV-
ICE AREA. 
..AHG l~!\IEXT 
POINT I 
THE PUBLIC SERVICE CO::\Il\HSSION OF UTAH DID 
NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO EXTEND SERVICE TO THE 
PROPERTY IN QUESTION. 
rl1 h i~ point i~ in an~w<.~r to first point of petitioners, 
whieh i~ ~tah'<l a~ follows: 
.. rrlw Public S<.~ITieP Conuuission of Utah 
erred in holding that for Fnion and Jordan Irri-
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g.ation Company to extend service to the prop-
erty herein involved would imperil service to its 
existing customers." (Italics ours.) 
We have not directly contradicted petitioners' first 
point for the reason that it does not accurately state 
the holding of the comrnission. It will be noticed that 
the order of the cmnmission never mentioned imperiling 
~elTice only to existing customers. It may be that service 
could not be extended without imperiling service to exist-
ing customers. This is true as there was testimony that 
on hot days the entire 1.5 c.f.s. "assigned" or dedicated 
to public use was being consumed. However, the com-
mission based its order upon the f.act that it was the 
future needs of the area designated which would be 
imperiled. The order states (after disposing of the claim 
of estoppel) : 
"This leaves two questions for consideration: 
( 1) Can the Public Service Commission require a 
public utility to provide service outside its pre-
scribed service area~ (2) Does the company in 
fact have sufficient water to provide the service 
requested by petitioners~ The cases are divided 
.as to whether the Commission has the right to 
require a public utility to provide service outside 
its prescribed area. This Commission, however, 
would certainly hesitate about ordering service 
outside a prescribed area if the evidence showed 
that it could not be done and at the same time 
take care of present and future needs of the custo-
mers within the area. The most recent case in-
volving the question of the company's supplying 
a petitioner outside its service area was the Now-
lan case. While the Commission did not decide the 
specific question as to whether the company could 
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be required to provide service outside its service 
area, it did conclude that the company did not 
have sufficient water to provide for present and 
future needs of customers within the area if it 
commenced supplying petitioners outside of the 
area. There is no evidence of these conditions 
having changed since the time of the determina-
tion of the Nowlan case and for the same reason 
it is the conclusion of this Commission that the 
company should not be required to furnish water 
to the petitioner.s in the instant case." (Tr. 30, 85). 
(Italics ours.) 
Petitioners in their brief under Point I have ignored 
three very important facts. First, that at the request of 
the Public Service Commission in 1946 the company filed 
.a map of the area it was willing to serve. Second, that 
it never assigned more than 1.5 c.f.s. of water to such 
service. Third, that it was stipulated that the areas des-
ignated might require as many as 6,000 connections (Tr. 
331). 
With regard to the 1.5 c.f.s. of water available for 
culinary distribution petitioners simply state that the 
limitation of 1.5 c.f.s ... is contrary to the evidence in this 
case." They then proceed to show that l'nion and Jordan 
Irrigation Company owns additional w.ater and proceed 
as if the lTnion and Jordan Irrigation Con1pany can be 
ordered to make this water available to anyone who 
happened to petition for water service. ~ls will be more 
specifically hereinafter pointed out it is not all of the 
assets of Union and Jordan Irrigation Con1pany which 
are subject to the order of the Connnission. The corpora-
tion was never fonned for the purpose of serving gen-
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erally as a public service corporation. For the purpose 
of arguing this point we will assume that Union and 
Jordan Irrigation Company and its stockholders may 
not now deny that it is subject to the orders of the Public 
Service Commission as to assets which it has dedicated 
to public use. Let us say that as to such assets it is a 
public utitilty by estoppel. The principle of estoppel can 
go no further than the repre.sentations which have been 
made. Petitioners have ignored the stipulation on this 
matter. The stipulation was (Tr. 330-331) : 
"The company was originally incorporated in 
1895 as a mutual water company for the purpose 
of distributing irrigation water to its stockholders. 
There has been no amendment to the original 
Articles of Incorporation except to extend the 
life of the corporation to 100 years. In about the 
year 1916 the company constructed a pipeline 
system for the purpose of serving culinary water 
and thereafter commenced serving culinary water 
to stockholders and non-stockholders alike. Sub-
sequent to the enactment of the Utah public utili-
ties laws the company submitted itself to the juris-
diction of the Public Utilities Commission of Utah 
and its successor, the Public Service Commission 
of Utah, and during all of the time since about 
1916 the company has served its area with culi-
nary water as a public utility. Originally the com-
pany assigned 2¥2 cubic feet per second of its 
water from Little Cottonwood Creek to its culi-
nary pipeline system. One cubic foot per second 
of this 2¥2 cubic feet per second however, was sold 
to Sandy City Corporation to raise funds for the 
construction of the company's pipeline system. 
The company through the years has maintained 
on file with this Commission its rates, rules and 
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regulations, has sought permission to make 
changes and adjustments in its rates, rules and 
regulations and continuously since 1936 has filed 
a financial report with the Public Service Com-
mission of Utah on the Commission's forms and in 
accordance with the Commission's rules and regu-
lations." (Italics ours.) 
Petitioners' first point depends entirely upon the 
power of the Public Service Commission to order the 
Union and Jordan Irrigation Company to dedicate to 
public use water which never has been so dedicated. The 
water over and above 1.5 c.f.s. has remained in the irri-
gation ditches and has been distributed to the share-
holders for irrigation purposes. There is no more reason 
to require the company to transfer the use of this water 
to the petitioner.s than water which may be owned by the 
stockholders individually in their own right or any other 
water regardless of its use or ownership. We stand on 
the proposition that property which has not been dedi-
cated to public use cannot be controlled by the Public 
Service Commission. 
However, assuming that for son1e reason the Public 
Service C01nmission were given power to order water 
owned hy a 1nutual water con1pany be subjected to distri-
bution hy a public utility, it should not be done on an 
applieation for serviee by private individuals. This would 
at best have to be a conden1nation proceeding by the 
pnhlic serviee eorporation in which issues of value, right 
to eondt'mn and other questions would be put in issue 
and triPd according to due process of law. There is no 
I a w whieh has yet 8.aid that property which is not dedi-
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cated to public use can be ordered into public use in such 
proceedings as these. If and when this can be done it 
must be by condemnation proceedings and this is not 
a condemnation proceeding. 
If we as.sume that granting the petition in question 
may not jeopardize present service, it will unquestionably 
jeopardize future service in the service are,a. 
Further discussion of the available water will be 
made under Point IV. 
POINT II 
THERE IS NO ESTOPPEL WHICH CAN BE APPLIED 
IN THIS CASE. 
(a) THE FACTS DO NOT WARRANT A FINDING OF A 
MISREPRESENTATION. 
(b) IF A MISREPRESENTATION WAS MADE THERE 
WAS NO RELIANCE THEREON TO THE DETRI-
MENT OF THE PETITIONERS. 
(c) ESTOPPEL MAY NOT BE INVOKED IN A PRO-
CEEDING BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COM-
MISSION AS THE BASIS FOR AN ORDER TO 
SERVE. 
(a) The facts do not warrant a finding of a misrepresenta-
tion. 
The misrepresentation relied upon is the letter to the 
State Board of Health to the effect that Robert McMullin 
had applied for culinary water for a proposed subdivi-
sion located "east of Third East at approximately 6900 
South." 
It is beyond dispute that 6900 South is within the 
area served by the company. It is in fact approximately 
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one-half city block south of the Selma No. 1 subdivision, 
being the property purchased from Selma Olson Malm-
strom and which is now being served. It is a long way 
south of the property in question. There was no mis-
representation. The letter itself is strong evidence that 
when Mr. McMullin told Mr. Pierson that he had bought 
the· Olson property, he told Mr. Pierson that it was the 
Selma Olson Malmstrom property. In any event the 
representation made was true. 
(b) If a misrepresentation was made there was no reliance 
thereon to the detriment of the petitioners. 
Petitioners, at pages 12 and 13 of their brief, quote 
from 19 American Jurisprudence as to the elements of 
estoppel. The last element is " ( 3) Action based thereon 
of such a character as to change his position prejudi-
cially." 
There is no evidence that petitioners have been prej-
udiced. On this question it is interesting to note the 
allegations of the petition. In paragraph 6 it is alleged 
(Tr. 2) that the petitioners have incurred large obliga-
tions and expended large sun1s of money to develop 
Selma No. 2 subdivision and have purchased pipe neces-
sary for the connections in Sehna X o. 2 subdivision. It 
is further alleged that unless petitioners are supplied 
with culinary water they will be unable to con1plete their 
plans for this subdivision for 31 homes ''to be con-
structed" and that the loss will be "approximately 
$50,000." 
It should be borne in mind that while Frank Pierson 
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denied having been told that McMullin was purchasin~ 
the James Olson property, as soon as he heard this was 
the case, he phoned Mr. McMullin and told him that the 
James Olson property was outside the area served by. 
the company. Mr. McMullin stated that a short time 
after he had completed the contr.acts to purchase the 
ground on March 8, 1955, that he was called by Frank 
Pierson and told that the property was north of the 
north boundary of the area (Tr. 392). The purchase 
price of the property was $2,000.00 per acre (Tr. 408). 
lie made no attempt to sell the property and recover 
the cost (Tr. 409, 411). While Mr. McMullin testified 
he thought the land was not worth $2,000.00 per acre 
without water, he also testified that he was not familiar 
with sales of similar land without culinary water. The 
questions and answers on the matter of sale and his 
qualification to determine values were .as follows: 
"Q. But you have never tried to sell it, as I under-
stand~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Never offered it for sale~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Are you familiar with the sale.s of similar 
land in the area~ Purchase - or other sales 
of similar land in the are.a that do not present-
ly have any culinary water system~ 
A. No, sir." (Tr. 425). 
No work was done on the proposed Selma No. 2 
subdivision except on a house that faces Third East 
which has water ( Tr. 406). While he had purchased 
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3,000 feet of pipe for the subdivision the market prices 
had gone up 10 cents per foot since the purchase and it 
was contemplated that it would all be sold to Union and 
Jordan Irrigation Company (Tr. 412). The McMullins 
were therefore in a position to 1nake a profit on the 
water pipe. 
There was some testimony that there had been engin-
eering fees paid of "9 hundred and some odd dollars'' 
( Tr. 396). There wa.s no testimony that this money would 
eventually be lost. Since there had been no attempt to 
sell the property and there would actually be a profit 
on the sale of the pipe, there was a chance that the :Jic-
:\Iullins would come out better than even. At least there 
was no proof that his position had been changed preju-
dicially. This is one of the necessary elements of estoppel 
according to all of the authorities including that quoted 
by petitioners. 
The supposed damages which were alleged to be 
$50,000.00 were the possible profits in building houses 
on the subdivisions (Tr. 395). The following is the ques-
tion and answer as to los.Ses other than the cost of the 
ground and cost of the pipe: 
•'Q. Now, will there be any other losses that you 
will suffer as a result if vou are not able to 
obtain culinary water fo~ this ground 1 
A. "\V ell, that being nry business, naturally I 
would suffer any loss-the loss of any profit 
I might have conten1plated:· (Tr. 395). 
The clai1n that loss of profits on houses never built is 
pn'.indieial is fallirious. 
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Estoppel as a principle is only invoked to prevent 
a loss. It cannot be used to make a profit. Nor can it 
be used against the state when it interferes with the 
police power. See Estoppel, 19 Am. J ur., 639, 818, sec-
tions 40, 41 and 166. 
The petitioners did not show that there was not 
other ground which could be purchased, subdivided and 
built on. Obviously there are thousands of acres of such 
ground in Salt Lake Valley. Profits are never a certain-
ty. Respondent can just as well urge that the McMullins 
may have lost money on the speculative building and 
thereby saved money by not getting the water. In fact, 
considering the location of this property in a good lo-
cation between ~Iurray .and l\iidvale this court might 
well take judicial notice that the petitioners have made 
a good deal. vVithout culinary water immediately avail-
able the land still has a very substantial value which may 
well be in exce.ss of $2,000.00 an acre. Furthermore, 
Union and Jordan Irrigation Company is not the only 
source of water for this or any other land. Supposedly 
the price was a fair one without the water. There was no 
evidence to the contrary by a qualified expert and the 
parties did not purport to buy and sell any water rights. 
There was testimony as follows : 
"Q. Did you or did you not ever ask James Olson 
if his land was within the area that was being 
served by Union and Jordan Irrigation Com-
pany? 
A. No. 
Q. Now, with regard to the water stock which 
you have in the Union and Jordan Irrigation 
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Company, is that-that is stock that you pur-
chased in connection with these two pieces of 
land, is it not~ 
A. Right. 
Q. And which one did you get it from or was it 
both, James Olson, or Selma~ 
A. The Union and Jordan water company shares 
came with the Selma Malmstrom property. 
Q. Now, you stated-and, of course, you didn't 
get any Union and Jordan stock from James 
Olson then~ 
A. That's true." (Tr. 403). 
(c) Estoppel may not be invoked in a proceeding before the 
Public Service Commission as the basis for an order to 
serve. 
Under this heading we should take a clear look at th~ 
relationship of the parties. This is not an action involv-
ing merely the Union and Jordan Irrigation Company 
and the petitioners. Public utilities are regulated by the 
Public Service Commis.sion for the good of the public 
generally. A public utility may not serve, agree to serve, 
or become bound to serve without the approval, consent 
and order of the Public Service Commission itself. Es-
toppel to be valid 1nust therefore necessarily apply 
against the Public Serviee Connnission. There is 
a long line of ca.ses by this court which hold that all 
contracts by a public utility are subject to .approval and 
orders of the Public Service Commission. See : 
Utah Hotel Company v. Public Utilities Com-
mission of Utah, 59 Utah 389, 204 Pac. 511; 
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Salt Lake City v. Utah Light & Traction Com-
pany, 52 Utah 210, 173 Pac. 556, 3 A.L.R. 
715; 
Union Portland Cement Co. v. Public Utili-
ties Commission of Utah, 56 Utah 175, 189 
Pac. 593; 
Murray City v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 56 
Utah 437, 191 Pac. 421; 
U. S. Smelting Refining and Mining Com-
pany v. Utah Power & Light Co., 58 Utah 
168, 197 Pac. 902; 
Utah Copper Co. v. Public Utilities Commis-
sion, 59 Utah 191, 203 Pac. 627. 
The position of petitioners with regard to this es-
. toppel and the legal answer thereto is well set forth in 
the order of the commission itself in the following state-
ment: 
"6. It is the main contention of the petition-
ers in this case that the company promised through 
its Secretary-Treasurer to serve the property 
of petitioners and that as a result of such promise 
the company is now estopped from denying serv-
ice and that petitioners have the same right to 
require the company to serve their property as 
any person requesting new service to property 
within the service area of the company as shown 
on Exhibit 1. 
* * * 
By virtue of the broad powers bestowed on 
the Public Service Commission for the regulation 
of public utilities it follows that all contracts rela-
tive to service must be subject to approval or dis-
approval by the Commission. It does not follow, 
however, that because one of the parties to the 
agreement is estopped from evading its obliga-
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tions that this Commission must require perform-
ance. The Commission is ,as free to ignore the 
terms of any such agreement with a public utility 
as it is to enforce or deny it. In other words, 
jurisdiction cannot arbitrarily be forced upon 
the Commission to enforce the terms of the con-
tract in question if such exists, even though at 
law the company might be estopped from evading 
performance. If jurisdiction could thus be forced 
arbitrarily upon the Commission the execution of 
its terms might be found to be against the public 
intere.st .and indirectly undermine the very au-
thority granted the Commission in regulating the 
affairs of a public utitlity. (See U.S. Smelting 
Refining and 11ining Co. v. Utah Power & Light 
Company, 58 rt. 168, 197 Pac. 902). This Com-
mission is not aware of the principle of estoppel 
having been evoked in any such case. However, 
there are numerous cases holding that the author-
ity given the Commission to regulate public utili-
ties puts all parties on notice that any agreement 
entered into is "'IYith those statutory provisions in 
mind. (See Xorth Salt Lake v. St. Joseph Water 
& Irrigation Cmnpany, 118 rtah 600, :2:23 Par. 
2d 577). If the Commission is right in this con-
clusion then the petitioners in the instant case 
do not have, as clailned, the s.ame status as pros-
pective custmners within the service area of the 
company." (Tr. 29). 
Certainly the orderly regulation of public utilities 
hy the Public Se1Tice Conunission cannot be interferred 
with h~· the prmnise of an officer of the public utility 
when it is well established that a valid contract is not 
binding on the co1nn1i ssion. In 1uany of the cases above 
ei ted there w.a.s action taken in reliance on the contract. 
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In such cases the elements of estoppel existed plus a 
valid contract. 
To summarize the main points on the estoppel ques-
tion: First, the letter cannot be interpreted .as referring 
to the property in question. Second, there is no preju-
dice shown since it was not shown that the land could not 
be resold for the price paid. There was no showing that 
the pipe purchased could not be u.sed elsewhere, but on 
the contrary it could be sold for a profit. Third, the Pub-
lic Service Commission cannot be controlled in its duty 
to the public by any representation of an official of the 
company. 
POINT III 
THE UNION AND JORDAN IRRIGATION COMPANY 
HAS NO OBLIGATION TO SERVE PETITIONERS IN THE 
AREA REQUESTED. 
This point is intended as a direct .answer to Point III 
in petitioners' brief. Point III as stated by petitioners 
is: 
''The Union and Jordan Irrigation Company 
as a public utility has an obligation to furnish 
service to users reasonably within its service 
area." 
rrhere is no such thing as property being "reason-
ably" within the area. It is either in or it is out. If the 
owner of adjacent and continguous property could get 
service by claiming to be "reasonably" within the area, 
the area would be exp.anded by degrees and there would 
be no stopping place. It is true that in the Brady-~1ilne 
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case the Public Service Commission used this language. 
The position of Union and Jordan Irrigation Company 
with regard to the Brady-Milne case is simply that it was 
erroneous. The commission refused to follow it in the 
Nowlan case even though the territory there involved 
was also contiguous. The commission did not, in the 
Nowlan case admit that it had erred in the Brady-Milne 
case. It did not have to. The Brady-Milne case was not 
appealed to this court and no question therein decided 
has been .sanctioned by this court. There is nothing un-
certain about the service area ·which is shown on Exhibit 
1. 
Commencing on page 15 of their brief, petitioners 
assert: 
"A public utility cannot resist on the ground 
that its facilities are inadequate. It has the obli-
gation to construct adequate facilities. It cannot 
defend upon the ground that its finances are in-
adequate as it has the obligation to secure ade-
quate finances. Even where the service rendered 
by the company entails the servicing of a natural 
commodity such as gas or water, the company 
cannot defend upon the grounds that its source 
of supply is being exhausted if it is ''ithin the 
power of the company to secure additional supply 
by purchase, condenmation, or by developn1ent of 
natural resources." 
No authority is cited for the proposition that a 
public water c01npany n1ust acquire additional water. 
If a public utility is ordered to acquire more water just 
what is it going to do~ It eannot conm1and the forces of 
nature. Water can be purchased only from those who 
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wish to sell. Even if the public service corporations 
could condemn water owned by private individuals there 
would be no public benefit as it would simply be a means 
of changing ownership. All water must be used bene-
ficially or lost. If a public service corporation is per-
mitted or required to condemn rights, think what would 
happen. A farmer with a section of land with inadequate 
culinary water for development into building lots could 
form a corporation, transferring some small water right 
to such corporation. This corporation would then apply 
for a certificate of convenience .and necessity as to some 
area for which there was water. Then with the power 
of eminent domain it would proceed to condemn any 
supply, however used, for development of the land of 
this particular owner. There are many reasons why the 
Public Service Commission should not and could not 
effectively require a public water company to extend 
service beyond its ability to supply. The quotation from 
American Juris prudence does not support petitioners' 
contention. In that quotation it is said: 
"Accordingly, a public utility, at the suit of a 
consumer, may be required to extend its service 
to an;y part of the district wherein it has received 
a franchise and has undertaken to operate, if the 
extension is a reasonable one, and a public service 
commission may, where its action is not unlawful, 
arbitrary or capricious, order such an extension 
of service for the inhabitants in such territory.'" 
-!3 Am. Jur. P. 602. 
The quotation definitely does not support the propo-
sition that a water company, in a state which has the law 
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of .appropriation, has to acquire water to serve additional 
territory. 
The que.stion of requiring a power company to ex-
tend its territory was considered though not decided by 
this court in the case of [Jtah Power & Light Company 
v. Public Service Commission, 1952, ______ Utah ______ , 249 
Pac. 2nd 951 (not reported in official Utah reports). This 
court held that Utah Power & Light Company had of-
fered to serve a certain area and based its order upon 
that finding of fact. However, that the decision might 
have been otherwise if such offer to serve had not been 
1nade, is shown by the following quotation from the opin-
ion of this court : 
"The Utah Power & Light Company attacks 
the lawfulness of the order of the Comn1ission 
that it sell such power to X ephi City at the near-
est point on its interconnected system where there 
are facilities of adequate capacity, on the grounds 
that it violates the rtah State Constitution and 
the United States Constitution because the order 
requires it to render service in an area it has 
never professed to serYe with one exception (The 
Thern1oid Rubber Co.) .and such requirement con-
stitute~ a taking of property without due process 
of law. In support of this contention it cites 
Northern Pac. Ry. Y. X orth Dakota, ~3ti U.S. 585, 
35 S. Ct. -l-:29, 59 L. Ed. 735: Interstate Commerce 
Connnission v. Oregon-"\Yashington R. R. & Xavi-
gation Co., :2SS U.S. 14, 53 S. Ct. :266, 77 L. Ed. 
f>SS; Hollvwood Chrunber of Couunerce Y. Rail-
road Cmninission of Calif., 19:2 Cal. 307, 219 P. 
983, 30 A.L.R. 68; Oklahmna Natural G.as Co. Y. 
Corp. Connn., SS Old. 51, 211 P. 401, 31 A.L.R. 330, 
P.U.R. 1923B, 823; Oldahmna Natural Gas Co. v. 
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Scott, 115 Okl. 8, 241 P. 164, P.U.R. 1926B, 67; 
Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Railroad Comm., 
173 Cal. 577, 160 P. 828, 2 A.L.R. 975, P.U.R. 
1917B, 336. Conceding that these cases are author-
ities for the proposition that it is beyond the 
powers of a public service commission to compel 
a public utility without its consent to extend lines 
into or serve .areas it has not professed or agreed 
to serve the question yet remains: Will the Utah 
Power & Light Company in selling power to Nephi 
City be performing a service it had not professed 
to give~ This is a question of fact and not of 
law." 
Furthern1ore an order to require a water company 
to extend its territory is very different than a power 
company. New electric power can be generated, new 
1cater cannot. 
If petitioners or this court are wondering how the 
respondent is going to serve the area designated with 
the possibility of 6,000 connections on 1.5 c.f.s., we simply 
say that the predicament in which this mutual water 
company now finds itself should not be aggravated by an 
order to serve more territory. 
POINT IV 
AS TO SERVICE OUTSIDE OF THE AREA DESIG-
NATED ON THE MAP FILED IN 1946, EXHIBIT 1, RE-
SPONDENT IS NOT A PUBLIC UTILITY. 
For the purpose of this case and for this purpose 
only, we will assume that the corporation and its stock-
holders are estopped to deny before this Commission 
that Union and Jordan Irrigation Company is a public 
utility as to the one and one-half second feet of water 
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which it ha.s dedicated to the culinary system. It may also 
be a public utility by estoppel as to the area designated 
on the map filed in 1946. But if it is a public utility by 
estoppel it can only be such to the extent it voluntarily 
served connections or represented to this Commission 
that it would serve. Estoppel can be imposed only to the 
extent that a representation has been made. 
Po.ssibly Union and Jordan Irrigation Company 
cannot now withdraw service which it has voluntarily 
and without objection of stockholders offered to give. 
However, the stockholders appeared in the Nowlan case 
and in this case and objected to the petition (Tr. 305). 
The Union and Jordan Irrigation Company itself has 
raised the defense that it is a mutual water company 
without corporate authority to act as a public utility. 
As to the right of stockholder.s generally to object to 
ultra vires transactions the following statement is made 
in 19 C.J.S. page 429, Sec. 973 of Corporations: 
"As a general rule, ultra vires transactions, 
as long as they remain executor:T, are unenforce-
able and their completion may be enjoined at the 
instance of stockholders." 
In 19 C.J.S. at 457, Sec. 995, it i8 also stated: 
"The powers of an officer or agent are neces-
sarilY lilnited to such acts or contracts as are ·with-
in the purposes for which the corporation was 
organized and the powers conferred upon it.,. 
The ~ituation as to new territory is identical 'Yith 
the situation a~ it would be if petitioners were reque.sting 
a 11mtnal water compan:- to serve the public for the first 
time. 
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That lack of authority in the articles of incorporation 
to act as a public utility is ground for denying or can-
celling a certificate even though the corporation has 
been acting as a public utility is demonstrated in the 
cases of Hough and Keenan Storage and Transfer Com-
pany v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, (Pa. 
1938) 2 Atl. 2d 548 and Mississippi-Gulf Port Compress 
and Warehouse Incorporated v. Public Service Commis-
sion, (Miss. 1940) 196 So. Rep. 793. In the Pennsylvania 
case, the court said : 
"The commission, in reviewing the scope of 
appellant's activities, found that in transporting 
for the general public goods and personal prop-
erty which did not go into, or come out of its ware-
house, it was carrying on the business of a com-
mon carrier. The appellant does not dispute this 
finding, but claims the right to carry on such 
business as a common carrier as being merely 
incidental to its corporate business of general 
warehousing. vV e are of the opinion that trans-
portation of goods as a common carrier cannot 
legally be made incidental to the carrying on of a 
general warehousing business, so as to permit a 
corporation organized for the latter purpose to 
carry on business as if under the former. No 
private corporation can carry on the business of 
a public utility except one that has been incor-
porated as a public utility. This will not inter-
fere with the right of the appellant to transport 
goods and personal property to its warehouse to 
be stored or from its warehouse to its customers 
home or place of business-these are proper in-
cidental powers-but it will prevent its transport-
ing, for the general public, goods and personal 
property which neither go into nor come from its 
warehouse." 
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"We are of the opinion that the Utility Com-
mission properly refused the certificate applied 
for therein, because this corporation had no char-
ter power to conduct the business of a carrier for 
hire either common or restricted, and if it had 
shown by its evidence the busine.ss it had there-
tofore done, the Commission could not by its cer-
tificate bless, forgive, or condone its past sins." 
Two Utah cases point out that stockholders in a 
mutual water company have the right to their aliquot 
proportion of the water owned by the company. While 
this right may be lost through failure to take action as 
to past transactions the right cannot be interferred with 
where the matter is tilnely raised. In the case of Big 
Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co., Kay, 108 utah 110, 157 
P .2d 795, the question was whether or not the company 
could sell its water for culinary purposes through water 
meters. The court held that the articles of incorporation 
were sufficiently broad for the corporation to do so. The 
court .said : 
"If this Compan~- had been incorporated as 
some n1utual irrigation cmnpanies are, with one 
purpose only set forth in the articles of incorpo-
ration, to-wit, the distribution of irrigation water 
from a definite source of supply, we would be 
compelled to adn1it that there is merit in appel-
lant's contentions .. :' 
In the case of Genola Totnl Y. Santaquin City. 96 
Utah 88, SO Pac. 2d 930, the court said: 
"*** Stock in a Inutual cmnpany entails the 
right to de1nand such stockholder's aliquot share 
of the water in proportion as his stockholding 
bears to all tlw stock. 'Vater rights .are pooled in 
a 1nutual eompany for convenience of operation 
,,-
;:.I. 
~ 001 
i IrE; 
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and more efficient distribution, and perhaps for 
more convenient transfer. But the stock certifi-
cate is not like the stock certificate of a company 
operated for profit. It is really .a certificate show-
ing an undivided part ownership in a certain 
water supply." 
POINT V 
THE ORDER IN THE CASE OF NOWLAN, PARKER 
AND ESKELSON v. UNION AND JORDAN IRRIGATION 
COMPANY PREVENTS FURTHER EXTENSION OF SERV-
ICE AREA. 
The Commission admitted in evidence the full order 
and report in the Nowlan case (Tr. 125-214). Admitted-
ly the present petitioners were not a party to that pro-
ceeding. However, that proceeding and the order therein 
is nevertheless .a fact. It is stated in that decision when 
referring to service to Nowlan, Parker and Eskleson that 
"such expansion could very well impair or destroy further 
expansion of service within the service area of the com-
pany as set forth in Exhibit 1.'' \Ve suggest that it is logi-
cal as well .as just to hold that when application for serv-
ice outside of a designated area is refused on the ground 
that such service would prevent expansion within the 
service area, that no subsequent petitioner should receive 
water outside of the area. The action of the Commission 
in granting such service would be arbitrary and dis-
criminatory against prior applicants. There are no facts 
in the present case not present in the Nowlan case ex-
cept the letter to the State Board of Health. Disregard-
ing such letter for the moment, the granting of the pres-
ent petition would be a preference to the present .appli-
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rReii 
cants and would mean money in m pocke1s and money 
out of pocket to Nowlan, Parker and Eskelson. 
This situation makes clear the inadequacy of a letter 
as a basis for service to McMullin. Assuming that the 
letter specifically referred to the James Olson property, 
the public cannot be discriminated against by the ability 
of one person, by misunderstanding or otherwise, to se-
cure a promise by an officer of a public utility. In the 
case of a public utility with limited resources as in the 
case of the water company, the water company should not 
be permitted to serve additional territory after it has re-
fused to extend its area because of limited water supply. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioners asserted three points as the basis of a 
reversal of the order of the Public Service Commission. 
These are set forth on page 7 of petitioners' brief. It 
might be said that these statements are insufficient on 
their face to justify petitioners' position. This is for the 
re~son that in the first point there is nothing said as to 
future customers within the service area. The fact that it 
might not imperil existing customers is insufficient on its 
face as a grounds for reversal. The second point, estop-
pel, is insufficient for the reason that as a matter of 
law estoppel will not support an order of the Publl-: 
Service Conunission. Third, there is no such thing as an 
obligation to furnish seiTice to users reasonablv withi:1 
its service area. The seiTice nwy only be required 
withi11, the service area. Actually this court should su::;-
tain a de1nurrrr to petitioners' points if such were a 
propPr attnek. 
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The principal point relied upon by petitioners in the 
hearing before the Public Service Commission was estop-
pel (second point set forth in the brief). This is clearly 
untenable because in addition to the fact that estoppel 
may not be the basis of a petition requesting the Public 
Service Commission to order service, there w.as no repre-
sentation that service would be given to this area and 
there was no change of position in reliance thereon which 
was prejudicial to the petitioners. As to petitioners' 
first point that the Commission erred in holding that to 
extend service would imperil service to existing custo-
mers, the Commission held that it would imperil service 
to existing and future customers. It was stipulated that 
the .service area might ultimately require 6,000 connec-
tions and there was no dispute that the 1.5 c.f.s. dedicated 
to the culinary system was being substantially exhausted 
by the present connections of a little over 1,000. As to 
the third point, there is no dispute from the evidence 
that the property in question was outside of the service 
area. 
Respondent further defends on the grounds that it 
has never offered to serve the area in question and the 
Public Service Commission cannot order a public utility 
to serve where it has never offered to serve. Further-
more, respondent is a mutual water company without 
authority in its .articles of incorporation to act a:s a. 
public utility. Assuming that it may not now deny service 
where it has offered to serve, it may not be ordered to 
exhmd itself as a public utility. This on the ground that 
it would be ultra vires. Objection has been made as to 
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this new service area by both the corporation and the 
stockholders. 
The petition further ~hould be denied for the reason 
that in the Nowlan case, being a similar previous request 
as to adjacent territory, the Commission found that there 
was insufficient water to serve a new area. 
The order of the Public Service Commission should 
be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, Attorney General 
GARY L. THEURER, Asst. Atty. General 
Attorneys for Respondents, Public Service 
Commission of Utah, Hal S. Bennett, Don-
ald Hacking and Jesse R. S. Budge, Its 
Commissioners. 
MARR, WILKINS & CANNON 
PAUL B. CANNON and 
JOHN W. HORSLEY 
Attorneys for Respondent, Union and 
Jordan Irrigation Company 
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